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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Dennis Smith served several years on a largely successful probation. While four 
of those years were served under a withheld judgment, eighteen months were served 
under a pronounced sentence. Pursuant to I.C. § 18-309, which governs the award for 
credit for time served, Mr. Smith should at least be credited for the time he successfully 
served his probation with a pronounced sentence pending, as that time is not properly 
included in the period for which the district court may deny credit. This is because while 
Mr. Smith was serving that time on probation, he was not "at large," and under the 
proper interpretation of the statute, only the time during which he was "at large" may be 
discredited. That interpretation is based on the proper application of the rules of 
statutory construction, which includes grammar rules. 
Therefore, this Court should vacate the district court's order denying credit for 
that time and remand for further proceedings. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In 2003, Mr. Smith was charged with forgery and misdemeanor possession of 
marijuana. (R., pp.37-38.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, he pied guilty to the forgery 
charge and the possession charge was dismissed. (R., p.50.) On December 3, 2003, 
the district court withheld judgment for a five-year period of probation. (R., pp.50-51.) 
Some three years later, on December 5, 2006, the State filed a Motion for Summons for 
Probation Violation. (R., pp.56-57.) However, it later moved to dismiss the violation, 
and on February 22, 2007, Mr. Smith was returned to probation. (R., p.68.) 
Mr. Smith was able to comply with the terms of his probation until November 13, 
2007, when he was alleged to have violated his probation by committing new crimes. 
1 
(See, e.g., R., p.101.) He admitted his violation of the terms of his probation, and on 
April 21, 2008, the district court revoked his withheld judgment and imposed a five-year 
unified sentence, with two years fixed. (R., p.115.) However, it suspended that 
sentence and reinstated his probation for a period of five years, imposing some 
additional terms for that period of probation. (R., pp.115-16.) 
Another set of violations was alleged to have occurred on April 17, 2009. 
(R., p.134-36.) After Mr. Smith admitted to some of the violations, the district court 
revoked his probation. (R., pp.143-44.) It did, however, retain jurisdiction. (R., p.144.) 
Mr. Smith performed well during his period of retained jurisdiction, and so was returned 
to probation on January 14, 2010. (R., pp.148-50.) However, another motion for 
probation violation was filed on September 1, 2010. (R., p.168.) Mr. Smith filed a 
motion for early release on October 18, 2010, arguing that the seven and one-half years 
he had served on probation exceeded his five-year unified term. (R., p.176.) On that 
motion, the district court wrote "Denied. Deborah A Bail, District Judge." (R., p.176.) 
The district court subsequently revoked Mr. Smith's probation and executed his 
sentence. (R., pp.180-81.) It did, however, credit him with 583 days against that 
sentence. (R., p.183.) 
Nearly a year later, Mr. Smith filed a motion for credit for time served, requesting 
583 days for the time he served during his period of retained jurisdiction, 33 days 
for time he spent incarcerated at the discretion of his probation officer, and 72 months 
(6 years) for the time he had served while on probation. (R., pp.185-87.) That motion 
bears a filing stamp dated October 27, 2011, indicating it doubles as an order. 
(R., p.185.) It also bears the district court's name and title, dated October 26, 2011. 
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(R., p.185.) That handwritten notation does not, however, indicate whether the motion 
was granted or denied. (See R., p.185.) 
Mr. Smith did, however, appeal from that order, indicating that it was denied. 
(R., p.195.) That notice of appeal was timely from the date on the filing stamp labeled 
"Order." (R., p.195.) Mr. Smith also filed a motion pursuant to I.C.R. 35 (hereinafter, 
Rule 35), indicating that the denial of credit for the time he served on probation made 
his sentence illegal in violation of his federal and state constitutional rights, as well as 
Idaho statutes, an argument he explained in the accompanying brief. (R., pp.227-47.) 
The district court wrote on the first page "Denied. Untimely. Deborah A. Bail, District 
Judge." (R., p.227.) 
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ISSUES 
1. Whether the district court erred in denying Mr. Smith credit for the time he served 
on probation. 
2. Whether the district court improperly denied Mr. Smith's Rule 35 motion and 
failed to provide an adequate record in regard to its denials of his Rule 35 motion 




The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Smith Credit For The 
Time He Served On Probation 
A. Introduction 
At issue in this case is the proper interpretation of Idaho Code § 18-309, which 
dictates when credit is to be awarded against a sentence. That code section provides: 
In computing the term of imprisonment, the person against whom the 
judgment was entered, [sic] shall receive credit in the judgment for any 
period of incarceration prior to entry of judgment, if such incarceration was 
for the offense or an included offense for which the judgment was entered. 
The remainder of the term commences upon the pronouncement of 
sentence and if thereafter, during such term, the defendant by any legal 
means is temporarily released from such imprisonment and subsequently 
returned thereto, the time during which he was at large must not be 
computed as part of such term. 
I.C. § 18-309.1 The statute, as it is currently written, does not specifically include or 
exclude periods of time when the defendant is on probation and adhering to the terms 
thereof. It does, however, explicitly exclude periods during which the defendant is "at 
large," which, in this context, is commonly understood to be absconding from probation. 
Therefore, the statute is ambiguous as to whether credit may be awarded for periods 
when the defendant is serving probation and adhering to the terms thereof. 
Based on the canons of statutory construction, which include the use of 
commonly-understood definitions for terms, as well as the use of grammar rules, the 
intent of the statute is revealed to intend credit to be awarded for such compliance with 
1 Mr. Smith recognizes that the period of time that he served on probation pursuant to 
a withheld judgment may not fall into "the remainder of the term," as his sentence had 
not been pronounced at that time. See I.C. § 19-2601 (3). As such, he recognizes that 
period of time may be excluded from the credit calculation. 
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probationary terms. Therefore, the district court erred when it declined to award such 
credit. This Court should remedy that error. 
B. Courts Must Adhere To The Rules Of Statutory Construction. Including Grammar 
Rules. In Order To Preserve The Constitutional Separation Of Powers With The 
Legislature 
Three provisions in the Idaho Constitution define the separation of powers 
between the three branches of government: Article 2 § 1; Article 3 § 1; and Article 
3 § 15. Mead v. Arnell, 117 Idaho 660, 664 (1990). The powers of government are 
intentionally split between the branches of government. IDAHO CONST., Art. II § 1. The 
Legislature is empowered to pass bills. IDAHO CONST., Art. Ill § 1. And no laws are to 
be passed except by bill. IDAHO CONST., Art. Ill § 15. Read together, these three 
constitutional provisions mean that only the Legislature is empowered to make "law." 
Mead, 117 Idaho at 664. In contrast, the Judiciary's duty is to interpret the law made by 
the Legislature. Id. Even if the statute, as written, is socially or otherwise unsound, the 
Legislature, not the Judiciary, is empowered to correct it. State v. Schwartz, 139 
Idaho 360, 362 (2003). Even if the statute is unambiguous but produces absurd results, 
the courts are powerless to interpret it so as to avoid the absurd results caused by the 
unambiguous interpretation. Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 
Idaho 889, 895-96 (2011 ). '"The public policy of legislative enactments cannot be 
questioned by the courts and avoided simply because the courts might not agree with 
the public policy so announced."' Id. (quoting State v. Village of Garden City, 74 Idaho 
513, 525 (1953)). As such, it is the Judiciary's job to simply interpret the statutes 
enacted by the Legislature and derive its intent behind those statutes. See id. 
In making such interpretations, the Judiciary has several canons of statutory 
construction which guide its analysis. The primary of these was reaffirmed in Verska: 
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where the statute is unambiguous, the courts are not empowered to do anything 
but adhere to the unambiguous meaning of the statute. See, e.g., id. Among the other 
canons is the requirement that the courts begin an interpretation of a statute by looking 
at the literal words used and giving them their plain meanings. Driver v. SI Corp., 139 
Idaho 423, 429 (2003); Wolfe v. Farm Bureau Ins. Serv. Co., 128 Idaho 398, 404 
(1996). In order to help understand the plain meaning, the courts look to the context in 
which those words are used. State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462 (1999). Doing so 
properly requires the courts to refer to "language canons." See, e.g., James J. Burndly 
and Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest for Neutral 
Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 12 (2005). These language canons refer to grammar 
rules which help the court understand the Legislature's choice of words and the 
grammatical ordering of those words. Id. They are not policy-driven and are designed 
to give effect to the ordinary understanding of the language itself. Id. 
The Court of Appeals recently attempted to interpret this statute in State v. Soto, 
2012 Unpublished Opinion No. 376, 2-3 (2012), rev. denied. That interpretation is not 
binding because the opinion was unpublished and is not to be considered authority. 
Therefore, Mr. Smith respectfully requests this Court apply the canons of statutory 
construction to give effect to the intent of this statute. 
C. Idaho Code § 18-309 Is Ambiguous In Regard To Whether Credit Is To Be 
Granted For Periods When The Defendant Is Not Incarcerated, But Is In 
Custody, Adhering To All The Restrictions Associated With Such Custody 
As noted, the primary statute governing credit for time served is Idaho 
Code § 18-309. It provides that: 
In computing the term of imprisonment, the person against whom the 
judgment was entered, [sic] shall receive credit in the judgment for any 
period of incarceration prior to entry of judgment, if such incarceration was 
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for the offense or an included offense for which the judgment was entered. 
The remainder of the term commences upon the pronouncement of 
sentence and if thereafter, during such term, the defendant by any legal 
means is temporarily released from such imprisonment and subsequently 
returned thereto, the time during which he was at large must not be 
computed as part of such term. 
I.C. § 18-309. When interpreting statutes, the courts start with the literal words used, 
given their ordinary meanings, and the statute will be construed as a whole. Grease 
Spot, Inc. v. Harnes, 148 Idaho 582, 584 (2010). If the statute is ambiguous, in that it 
has more than one reasonable interpretation, the courts seek to determine the 
legislative intent by examining the language used, the reasonableness of the various 
interpretations, and the policy behind the statute. Verska, 151 Idaho at 895-96. 
In this case, the statute is ambiguous because it fails to explicitly address 
whether credit is appropriately awarded for periods of time when the defendant is in the 
custody of the Department of Correction, but not imprisoned, and adhering to all the 
terms of such custody.2 It does, however, explicitly provide that periods of incarceration 
are credited and times during which the defendant (who, by a legal means has been 
temporarily released) is "at large" are not. I.C. § 18-309. 
In regard to those two situations, the statute is not ambiguous. The period of 
incarceration is easily determined, as it is the period of time the defendant spends in a 
prison or other penal institution. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS, 413 
(2007). The term "at large" is similarly unambiguous, although it is a unique term of art 
with its own ordinary definition: "1. Free; unrestrained; not under control <the suspect is 
2 The Court of Appeals has recognized that there is a difference between "incarceration" 
and "custody." Taylor v. State, 145 Idaho 866, 869-70 (Ct. App. 2008). For example, a 
probationer remains in the custody of the Department of Correction, but is not 
incarcerated during the period of probation. I.C. §§ 19-2601 (2), 19-2604. 
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still at large>."3 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 52 (3d Pocket ed. 2006). Certain terms and 
phrases, such as "at large," have developed a specific meaning during the course of 
history and the Legislature is presumed to have full knowledge of such definitions when 
it uses the term in a statute.4 See Robison v. Bateman-Hall, Inc., 139 Idaho 207, 212 
(2003) (discussing a situation where jurisprudence expanded the definition of the term 
in question beyond a common-usage definition for purposes of a specific statute). As 
there is such a definition for the term "at large," the Legislature is presumed to have 
been aware of it when it used the term in I.C. § 18-309. See id. 
This definition of "at large," as one who is free, unrestrained, or not under control, 
cannot apply to probationers because, as the United States Supreme Court has long 
recognized, "by virtue of their status alone, probationers '"do not enjoy "the absolute 
liberty to which every citizen is entitled,"'" justifying the "impos[ition] [of] reasonable 
conditions that deprive the offender of some freedoms enjoyed by law-abiding citizens." 
Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848-49 (2006) (quoting United States v. Knights, 
534 U.S. 112, 119 (2001), in turn quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 
3 The other definitions apply when the term is used in reference to a non-topical or 
unlimited discussion (i.e., at large election, discussion of an issue at large). See BLACK'S 
LAW DICTIONARY 52. 
4 In this regard, Idaho courts have long used the term "at large" to refer to persons not in 
custody and whose whereabouts are unknown. See, e.g., Jacobson v. McMi/lian, 64 
Idaho 351 (1943) ("to escape and be at large"); State v. Kessler, 151 Idaho 653, 655, 
658 (Ct. App. 2011) (using "at large" to describe a situation where two accomplices had 
not been apprehended and whose whereabouts were unknown in the immediate 
aftermath of a crime); see State v. Swisher, 125 Idaho 797, 799 (Ct. App. 1994); 
State v. Shanks, 139 Idaho 152, 156 (Ct. App. 2003); but see Cornell v. Mason, 46 
Idaho 112, 268 P. 8, 11 (1928) ("If [the defendant] is permitted to go at large out of the 
jail, except by virtue of a legal order or process, it is an escape."). The Legislature has 
also used this term in accordance with this definition: "the court ... must order the 
defendant to be brought before it, or if he is at large a warrant for his apprehension may 
be issued." I.C. § 19-2715(3) (implying that, when the defendant is in custody, he may 
simply be brought before the court, but if he is at large, his whereabouts are unknown 
and a warrant is necessary to secure his appearance). 
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(1987), in turn quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972)). It has also 
recognized that probation is like incarceration, in that it is a punishment imposed by the 
justice system, and like other forms of punishment, restricts the person's freedoms. 
Knights, 534 U.S. at 119. As such, the sentencing court may impose those restrictive 
conditions on the probationer that it deems to be necessary and expedient. I.C. § 19-
2601 (2). The only major limitation is that the terms must not be impossible for the 
probationer to adhere to. See, e.g., State v. Breeden, 129 Idaho 813, 816 (Ct. App. 
1997). 
As such, probationers, by definition, cannot be free, unrestrained, and not under 
control. See, e.g., Samson, 547 U.S. at 848-49; Knights, 534 U.S. at 119; Griffin, 483 at 
874; Morrissey408 U.S. at 480; Breeden, 129 Idaho at 816. Mr. Smith's situation was a 
perfect example of how a probationer is not free, but is rather restrained and controlled 
by the court and Department of Correction. He was subject to at least eleven different 
"special conditions" while he was on probation.5 (Presentence Investigation Report 
(hereinafter, PSI), pp.165-66, 232-33.)6 He was controlled, in that he had to maintain 
full-time employment. (PSI, p.165.) He was required to attend any treatment program 
recommended by his probation officer, as well as the Cognitive Self Change program. 
(PSI, p.165.) He was also required to participate in a mental health evaluation and 
obtain any additional treatment recommended as a result. (PSI, p.233.) His right to 
privacy was also restrained, as he was required to waive his Fourth Amendment 
5 When the district court revoked Mr. Smith's withheld judgment and returned him to 
probation, it modified some of the terms of that initial probation and added others. 
~See PSI, pp.232-33.) 
PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file 
"SmithPSl.pdf." Included in this file is the PSI report as well as all the documents 
attached thereto (i.e., police reports, addendums to the PSI). 
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constitutional rights regarding searches of his person and property. (PSI, p.166.) He 
was not free in his use of his money, as he was prohibited from purchasing certain 
items, such as firearms, and as he was required to pay all court-imposed costs, 
including restitution and the costs for supervision. (PSI, p.166.) He was restricted in 
regard to his whereabouts, as he was required to waive extradition and not contest 
efforts to return him to Idaho, regardless of whether his absence from the state was 
approved by his probation officer. (PSI, p.166.) 
Mr. Smith complied with the initial restraints and controls on his freedom 
pursuant to his probation and withheld judgment for three to four years.7 He was also 
able to comply with the terms of his probation for a total of approximately eighteen 
months after his sentence was pronounced. (See R., pp.115-16, 134-36, 148-50, 168.) 
During those periods, Mr. Smith accepted the restrictions to his rights and restraints to 
his freedom that are associated with all forms of punishment imposed by the criminal 
justice system. See Knights, 534 U.S. at 119. As such, he was not free, unrestrained, 
or not under control due to the terms of his probation. Therefore, he, like all other 
probationers adhering to the terms of their probation, was not "at large" during his 
period of probation, based on the ordinary definition of the term. 8 As a result of 
7 There was a violation reported after three years, but proceedings were dismissed by 
the State. (R., pp.56-57, 68) Mr. Smith complied with the terms for another year before 
the first fully-litigated violation occurred. (See, e.g., R., p.101.) 
8 None of the violations which were admitted or proven were for absconding. The 
dismissed charges in 2006 were for failure to pay fines, costs, and restitution (R., p.57.) 
Mr. Smith admitted to committing a new crime (petit theft) in 2007. (R., pp.101, 113.) 
He did admit to one failure to report in 2007, along with unauthorized termination of 
employment. (R., pp.135, 141.) Finally, the State proved that he failed to attend or 
complete required classes, frequented a business with alcohol sales as its primary 
income, consumed alcohol, committed a new crime (open container), failed to notify his 
probation officer of the new citation, and possessed marijuana in 2010. (R., pp.169-70, 
178.) 
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understanding the ordinary definitions of the words used in this part of the statute, it is 
unambiguous: the time during which a defendant is "at large" shall not be credited. 
See I.C. § 18-309; Verska, 151 Idaho at 895-96. It is also unambiguous that, by virtue 
of their status, probationers adhering to the terms of their probation cannot be included 
in the term "at large" under its ordinary definition. Therefore, the district court's denial of 
credit for that time was in error. 
D. The Statute Does Not Prohibit Credit For The Period Of Probation, Based On A 
Proper Application Of Grammatical Rules And Because Probation Is Not A 
"Temporary" Release 
Due to the fact that the defendant, who is in custody but not in prison, and who is 
adhering to the terms of his probation, is not expressly excluded or included by the 
statute, the statute is at least ambiguous in regard to whether credit is appropriately 
awarded for that period of time. Thus, in order to determine the legislative intent of this 
statute in that regard, it is necessary to examine the language used, the potential 
interpretations, and the policy of the statute. See, e.g., Verska, 151 Idaho at 895-96. 
1. Pursuant To Grammar Rules Of Interpretation. The Term "By Any Legal 
Means" Cannot Modify The Term "At Large" 
The sentence in need of interpretation reads: 
The remainder of the term commences upon the pronouncement of 
sentence and if thereafter, during such term, the defendant by any legal 
means is temporarily released from such imprisonment and subsequently 
returned thereto, the time during which he was at large must not be 
computed as part of such term. 
I.C. § 18-309. The Court of Appeals attempted to interpret the statute in regard to the 
period of time and determined that "the phrase 'by any legal means' modifies 'at large."' 
Soto, 2012 Unpublished Opinion No. 376, pp.2-3. And because probation is a legal 
means, the Soto Court determined that the statute prevented granting credit for time 
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served on probation. Id. Besides being nonbinding, that interpretation is unreasonable 
because it does not adhere to the rules of grammar or statutory construction. The term 
"by any legal means" is an adverb phrase which modifies "release," and is in the 
introductory, dependent clause of the relevant part of the sentence. "At large" is in a 
different clause and is part of a restrictive appositive phrase modifying "the time." See 
I.C. § 18-309. As such, the term "by any legal means" cannot modify "at large." 
The sentence at issue has two independent clauses separated by the 
conjunction "and." See I.C. § 18-309. The second clause, starting with "if thereafter," is 
a conditional independent clause, and it addresses when credit is properly denied.9 
See id. In order to fully understand this clause, it is necessary to identify therein the 
various modifiers and their objects. The basic sentence is actually "If the defendant is 
released and returned, the time must not be computed as part of such term." See id. At 
first glance, this would seem to support the Soto Court's interpretation, but a proper 
analysis of the various modifiers that the Legislature added to this basic sentence 
reveals that interpretation was, in fact, incorrect. 
First, the term "release" is the object of four different adverbs and adverb 
phrases: "during such term" (when the defendant is released), "by any legal means" 
(how the defendant is released), 10 "temporarily" (how long the defendant is released), 
9 It is "conditional" in the sense that it provides that the time credited against the 
imposed sentence will stop being counted if a certain set of conditions comes to pass. 
See I.C. § 18-309. As such, it also implies that if the set of conditions does not arise, 
the time served continues to count against the sentence. See id. 
10 This modifier is actually misplaced, which IT.lay have contributed to the Soto Court's 
misinterpretation of the statute. Were it properly placed, it would either be after the first 
auxiliary in the verb phrase (i.e., "the defendant is by any legal means temporarily 
released") or after the entire verb phrase (i.e., "the defendant is temporarily released by 
any legal means"). THE REDBOOK: A MANUAL ON LEGAL STYLE, 10.40(a) at 174-75 
(Bryan A. Garner, et al., 2d ed. 2006). The reason it should have been placed in those 
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and "from such imprisonment" (from where the defendant is released). See id. Second, 
the term "returned" is modified by its own pair of adverbs: "subsequently" (when the 
defendant is returned), and "thereto" (to where the defendant is returned). 11 The 
remaining language, "during which he was at large," is a restrictive appositive phrase, 
which modifies "the time." THE REDBOOK: A MANUAL ON LEGAL STYLE 1.6(c) at 6-7 (Bryan 
A. Garner, et al., 2d ed. 2006). As an appositive phrase, it could be removed without 
changing the overall meaning of the sentence (i.e., there is some time which is not to be 
credited). See REDBOOK, 1.6(a) at 6. However, the phrase serves to provide additional 
information about the term which it modifies. REDBOOK, 1.6(a) at 6. Because this 
information is essential to identify and understand the noun it modifies (i.e., what time is 
"the time"), the appositive phrase is classified as "restrictive," and it limits the potential 
period to which "the time" might refer. See REDBOOK, 1.6(c) at 6-7. Because "by any 
legal means" does not modify "the time," it cannot modify a lesser-included aspect of 
that term (i.e., the restrictive modifier "at large"). 
Furthermore, the punctuation in the statute reveals that the two terms ("by any 
legal means" and "at large") are in separate clauses within the larger, conditional 
clause. "By any legal means" is part of a dependant introductory clause, which is 
separated from the subsequent independent clause by a comma 12: "if thereafter, during 
such term, the defendant by any legal means is temporarily released from such 
imprisonment and subsequently returned thereto, the time during which the 
locations is to promote clarity and flow within the clause. Id. Regardless of its 
placement, grammatically it still modifies "release," not "at large." 
11 "Thereto," as an unspecific adverb, refers back to "such imprisonment" as the place to 
where the defendant is returned. 
12 The independent clause reads: "the time during which he was at large must not be 
computed as part of such term." I.C. § 18-309. 
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defendant was at large .... " I.C. § 18-309 (emphasis added to the comma at issue). 
As the two terms are in different clauses, "by any legal means" cannot modify "at 
large."13 
After understanding which phrases modify which terms, the next step is to 
determine whether probation meets all the conditions established in the introductory 
dependant clause, so that it would fall into the category of time that is excluded from 
credit awards. It does not because probation is not "a temporary release from such 
imprisonment by legal means." See id. 
2. As Probation Is Not A "Temporary" Release, It Does Not Meet All The 
Conditions So That Credit May Be Denied For The Time Served Pursuant 
To That Period Of Probation 
As noted, ordinary definitions are used in the analysis of the terms in the 
introductory dependant clause. Verska, 151 Idaho at 895-96. Mr. Smith recognizes 
that, by ordinary definition, probation is a release from imprisonment (imposed at the 
pronouncement of sentence and subsequently suspended), and that probation is a legal 
means to secure that release. See I.C. § 19-2601(2). It is not, however, temporary. 
The word "temporary" is ordinarily defined as "lasting for a time only." MERRIAM-
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY, 821. Therefore, the phrase "by any legal means is temporarily 
released from incarceration" is ordinarily understood to mean "by legal means is 
released for a time only from such incarceration." See id. 
Probation, however, is not designed to release the person from incarceration for 
a time only; it is designed to release him from incarceration permanently. See, e.g., 
13 Were "by any legal means" intended to modify "at large," the sentence would need to 
be rewritten so that the modifier ("by any legal means") and object ("at large") were 
close together in the sentence. REDBO0K, 10.29 at 168-69 (refer specifically to the 
parenthetical in the example labeled "Before" on page 169). 
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I.C. § 19-2604(1). If a probationer successfully completes his period of probation, he is 
not required to return to prison. See id. Rather, when the sentencing court determines 
that the defendant has satisfactorily completed the period of probation, it may: 
terminate the sentence; set aside the guilty plea or conviction, dismiss the case, and 
discharge the defendant; or, amend the sentence to be equivalent to the period of time 
the defendant served in a penal facility prior to the suspension of his sentence, which 
may then be treated as a misdemeanor.14 I.C. § 19-2604(1). Regardless of which 
option the sentencing court opts to use, the defendant is free to leave custody and is 
not required to return to prison before doing so. See id. Therefore, a term of probation 
cannot be classified as a "temporary" release from incarceration or a release from 
incarceration "for a limited time only." See MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY, 821. 
This distinction becomes clear when the period of probation is compared to the 
grant of a furlough to an inmate. Furloughs are a legal means which permit an 
incarcerated person to be released from that incarceration so they might maintain 
regular employment, schooling, and the like. I.C. § 20-242(1 ). However, unlike the 
probationer, who is not required to return to the prison, the furloughed inmate must 
return to incarceration during the time he is not participating in the activity underlying 
his furlough. I.C. §§ 20-242(3); 20-614(3). As a result of the requirement that the 
furloughed inmate return to the place of his incarceration, the release is "for a limited 
time only" (i.e., the hours allotted for the employment or schooling), and thus, it is 
14 In the case where the sentencing court retains jurisdiction, it is limited to only the third 
option, presumably because the period of retained jurisdiction necessarily incorporates 
a period of incarceration while the defendant participates in the rider program. See 
I.C. § 19-2604(2). As incarceration served for that charge, the defendant is entitled to 
credit for that time. I.C. § 18-309. Therefore, there must be a sentence against which 
credit can be awarded. 
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"temporary."15 As the probationer carries no such similar requirement to return to 
incarceration, his release is not temporary. 
Further exemplifying why probationers are not temporarily released, they have a 
constitutionally-protected liberty interest in remaining on probation. State v. Rose, 144 
Idaho 762, 766 (2007) (citing Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489). As such, before the State 
may terminate that period of probation, it must provide the defendant with certain due 
process protections. Id. This makes probation distinctly different from temporary 
releases, like furloughs, which may be revoked at any time by the Department of 
Correction without providing due process protections, specifically notice and a hearing. 
See I.C. § 20-242(7). Because the probationer has this protected liberty interest in 
continued release, the State cannot simply revoke probation and execute the sentence 
at its discretion, like it can with a furlough. Rather, it must make a showing of proof in a 
forum affording these due process protections before a period of probation may be 
terminated. As such, release on probation is designed to be permanent, not temporary. 
As probationary release is not temporary, the period during which the defendant 
is on probation does not meet all the requirements necessary to trigger the condition 
which allows for the court to deny credit. See I.C. § 18-309. Therefore, under a proper 
interpretation, I.C. § 18-309 does not allow the denial of credit for the period when 
Mr. Smith was in custody while on probation and adhering to the terms thereof. As 
such, it was improper for the district court to deny his motion for credit for that time. 16 
15 I.C. § 18-309 would provide, therefore, that should an inmate on furlough fail to report 
back after the temporary period (and thus become "at large"), he should not get credit 
for the time during which he is at large. I.C. § 18-309. This is consistent with the 
furlough statute, which classifies such a failure to conform to the restrictions of the 
release as an "escape." I.C. § 20-242(6). 
16 Even if the statute is unambiguous, the grammatical rules of interpretation still prevent 
the district court from denying credit for such periods. The ordinary definition of the 
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E. The Period During Which The Defendant Is "At Large" Only Applies To Periods 
When He Has Escaped Or Absconded, Not The Entire Period Of Probation 
Even if this Court determines that probation constitutes a temporary release, the 
statute still does not permit the denial of credit for the period during which the defendant 
was adhering to the terms of his probation. I.C. § 18-309 establishes that defendants 
are to be credited for periods of incarceration and are to not be credited for periods 
during which they were "at large." Id. However, just because probation is a legal 
means of release does not mean that the probationer is at large, and so cannot receive 
credit for the time on probation. Such an interpretation ignores the ordinary definition of 
the term "at large" and makes an invalid equation of the period of temporary release to 
the period during which the defendant was "at large." Therefore, it is an unreasonable 
interpretation and must be rejected. See Verska, 151 Idaho at 895-96. 
First, this Court must consider the Legislature's choice of terms. See id. "[The 
Idaho Supreme Court] assumes that the [L]egislature meant what is clearly stated in the 
statute." State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462 (1999). In this case, the Legislature opted 
to use a unique term of art-"at large"-which has a specific definition: "Free; 
unrestrained; not under control <the suspect is still at large>." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 
52. Where terms and phrases, such as "at large," have developed specific definitions, 
the Legislature is presumed to have full knowledge of that definition. See Robison, 139 
Idaho at 212. The term "at large" has developed such a specific definition. BLACK'S LAw 
DICTIONARY 52; see note 4, supra. 
terms, particularly "temporarily," still indicate that, as discussed in this section, probation 
does not meet all the conditions to trigger the situation for which credit is to be denied. 
See Verska, 151 Idaho at 895-96. Therefore, even under an unambiguous statute, the 
denial of credit was contrary to the statute. 
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By using this particular term, the Legislature intended that it mean something 
different than simply being "temporarily released from such imprisonment by legal 
means." This is because when courts engage in statutory construction, they are to 
favor interpretations which give meaning to every word, clause, and sentence the 
Legislature chose to use. Obendorf v. Terra Hug Spray Co., Inc., 145 Idaho 892, 900 
(2008). Reading the terms "temporarily released by legal means" and "at large" as 
coextensive deprives the term "at large" of meaning, which would improperly make it 
surplussage. See id; State v. Martinez, 126 Idaho 801,803 (1995). Had the Legislature 
intended to remove the entire period during which the person was temporarily released 
from the credit scheme, it would have used the same term, "temporarily released," in 
both parts of the statute. 17 Instead, the Legislature chose to use a different, narrower, 
term to describe the period of time for which credit is not to be awarded. See I.C. § 18-
309. Because it chose to use a different term with a different definition, that term must 
have a different meaning in the statute. See Obendorf, 145 Idaho at 900; Martinez, 126 
Idaho at 803. 
Furthermore, it chose to use the term as part of a restrictive appositive phrase, 
see Part (0)(1 ), supra, which means that the time for which credit may be denied is 
limited to only the time "during which [the defendant] was at large." See I.C. § 18-309. 
This must be the case, or else the phrase serves no purpose except to rename the 
noun (i.e., the time). See REDBOOK, 1.6(b)-(c) at 6-7. As a result, it would impermissibly 
become surplussage. See Obendorf, 145 Idaho at 900; Martinez, 126 Idaho at 803. 
Grammatically, the key identifying feature between a restrictive and a nonrestrictive 
17 For example, "during such term, the defendant by any legal means is temporarily 
released from such imprisonment and subsequently returned thereto, the time during 
which he was [temporarily released] must not be computed as part of such term." 
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appositive phrase is whether the phrase is set off from the remainder of the sentence by 
commas. REDBOOK, 1.6(b)-(c) at 6-7. A nonrestrictive appositive phrase, which would 
simply rename the noun with nonessential information, will be offset by commas, while a 
restrictive appositive phrase will not. Id. Because the Legislature did not offset the 
phrase with commas, 18 the phrase "during which he was at large," which provides 
essential information describing to which period of time the Legislature is referring, must 
be a restrictive appositive phrase. REDBOOK, 1.6(b)-(c) at 6-7. Therefore, if the 
defendant was not "at large," then there is no time for which he may be denied credit. 
The Legislature's intent behind using this restrictive term and phrase to limit the 
time for which credit may be denied is clarified by referring to the illustrative definition of 
"at large," which reads: "<the suspect is still at large>." BLACK'S LAW D1cr10NARY 52. 
This example refers to a situation where the person is not in custody, but rather, is 
evading capture and at a location unknown to authorities. See id.; note 4, supra. In 
fact, the Court of Appeals, specifically in regard to I.C. § 18-309, has recognized that 
this is the proper use of the term: "a prisoner who escapes from incarceration should 
[not] be permitted accrual of the time toward his sentence while he is at large." 
Application of Chapa, 115 Idaho 439, 443 (Ct. App. 1989) (emphasis added). In a 
similar situation, the Court of Appeals modified a district court's award of credit to deny 
the award for three days, "tak[ing] into account the three days that [the defendant] was 
at large following his escape." Fullmer v. Collard, 143 Idaho 171, 172 n.2 (Ct. App. 
2006) (emphasis added). As such, the term "at large" does not broadly apply to all 
18 "[T]he time during which he was at large must not be computed .... " I.C. § 18-309. 
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situations where the defendant is not incarcerated, but rather, only to those situations 
where he is not in custody and his whereabouts are unknown. 
In the context of probation, those conditions are only met when the probationer 
absconds from supervision. However, while Mr. Smith was conforming to the 
conditions of his probation, his whereabouts were known. (See Prior R., pp.147-48.) 
He also remained in the custody of the Department of Correction throughout that time. 
See§§ 19-2604(1), 20-219(1). As such, he was never "at large," as the term is 
ordinarily defined. See, e.g., Chapa, 115 Idaho at 443; Fullmer, 143 Idaho at 172, n.2; 
note 4, supra. 
Therefore, by examining the specific term of art the Legislature chose to use, its 
intent becomes clear: the only scenario in which it intended a probationer to be denied 
credit under this statute was if he absconds. Therefore, the statute is properly 
interpreted to read, "the time during which he was [absconding] must not be computed 
as part of such term." I.C. § 18-309. And, pursuant to the reasonable interpretation of 
the statute, denying Mr. Smith credit for the time during which he was not at large, but 
rather in the custody of the Department of Correction and adhering to the numerous 
restraints and controls on his freedom (which the Supreme Court recognized functioned 
to restrict the defendant's actions just like incarceration), was improper. See id. 
The rationales supporting this interpretation are twofold. First, to interpret "at 
large" as equivalent to "temporarily released by legal means," and so deny credit for 
time served on probation, would place this statute in inherent conflict with other 
sections of this statutory scheme. For example, an inmate who is granted a furlough is 
temporarily released from incarceration by legal means. See I.C. § 20-242. However, if 
"at large" is to be read as equivalent to the period of that temporary release, the 
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furloughed inmate would not be entitled to credit during the time he is not incarcerated 
(i.e., released on furlough). Such a result is directly contrary to the purpose of the 
furlough statute, which was enacted to provide an incarcerated person serving his 
sentence with the opportunity to maintain his employment or complete his education 
without undue interruption from the sentence. See I.C. § 20-242(1)-(2). He was meant 
to be able to serve his sentence (i.e., get credit against his sentence) while 
simultaneously being released from incarceration in order to continue his employment 
or education. See id. As a result, such an interpretation of the statute would create 
direct discord in regard to these and similar situations. 
The reason why such an interpretation is improper because the courts are duty-
bound, when construing statutes, to harmonize and reconcile the statutory scheme 
whenever possible. Dept. of Health and Welfare v. Housel, 140 Idaho 96, 104 (2004); 
State v. Gamino, 148 Idaho 827, 829 (Ct. App. 2010). As this interpretation creates 
discord between the statutes and a harmonizing interpretation-that only the period 
during which the released inmate is not in custody (i.e., absconds) must not be 
credited-is possible, the discordant interpretation should be rejected. See id. As such, 
this Court should comply with its duty and adopt the harmonizing interpretation instead. 
See id. 
The second reason why the alternative interpretation is unreasonable is that the 
Legislature has already provided that parolees are able to receive credit for the time 
during which they are released from incarceration pursuant to the terms of their parole, 
with such credit awarded at the discretion of the parole board. I.C. § 20-228; 1998 
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Idaho Session Laws, ch. 327, § 2, p.1057; compare with I.C. § 18-309.19 However, 
under the discordant interpretation, probationers are prevented from receiving such 
similar treatment. See Soto, 2012 Unpublished Opinion No. 376, 2-3. The incongruity 
of maintaining such a distinction, particularly between two such similar situations, was 
criticized by Judge Schwartzman soon after the Legislature made the change in the 
parole statute: "If a parolee may now be able to receive some discretionary credit for 
time actually spent on parole in an unincarcerated [sic] status, how much sense does it 
make to not give a probationee [sic] credit for time served while actually incarcerated as 
a condition of probation?" State v. Jakoski, 132 Idaho 67, 69 (Ct. App. 1998) 
(Schwartzman, Judge, specially concurring) (emphasis in original). Judge 
Schwartzman was particularly focused on the denial of credit for the time the 
probationer served in a county jail. See id., at 67-68. However, his statement reveals 
that the criticism is broader. See id. He pointed out that the jail time was a condition of 
probation, which implied the broader criticism, that "it is nonsensical and improper to 
allow credit for parolees who adhere to the terms of their parole, but not credit 
probationers who adhere to the terms of their probation (which may include serving jail 
time)." See id. Such a result creates significant discord in these two sections of the 
statutory scheme. This is particularly troublesome because the two situations are so 
similar that some aspects, such as the supervisory authority of the Department of 
19 Of particular note in this comparison is the fact that I.C. § 20-228 provides "[f]rom and 
after the issuance of the warrant and suspension of the parole of any convicted person 
and until arrest, the parolee shall be considered a fugitive from justice." I.C. § 20-228. 
This corresponds with I.C. § 18-309's prohibition against the award of credit for time that 
the defendant is "at large" (i.e., a fugitive). See I.C. § 18-309; MERRIAM WEBSTER'S 
D1cr10NARY 329. Despite that assertion, however, I.C. § 20-228 immediately goes on to 
provide that the parole commission may grant credit for the time which the parolee 
served on parole. I.C. § 20-228. Therefore, a similar interpretation of I.C. § 18-309 is 
also reasonable. 
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Correction in both instances, are addressed in a single statute. See, e.g., I.C. § 20-
219(1). 
Therefore, in order to avoid the discord caused by such incongruous 
contradictions in the statutory scheme, the term "at large" cannot be read to be more 
than a period during which the probation absconds. See Housel, 140 Idaho at 104; 
Gamino, 148 Idaho at 829. Such an interpretation is unreasonable because it would 
make I.C. § 18-309 incoherent within the context of the criminal justice system as a 
whole, and therefore, such an interpretation must be rejected. See id. 
F. The Statute Is, At Least Ambiguous, And The Rule Of Lenity Requires That 
Ambiguity Be Resolved In Mr. Smith's Favor 
To the extent that there are multiple, rational interpretations of the terms in the 
statute, specifically in regard to the terms "at large" and "temporarily released," this 
statute is, at least, ambiguous as to whether credit should be given for time spent in the 
custody of the Department of Correction adhering to all the restrictive terms of 
probation. See Verska, 151 Idaho at 895-96. In such an instance, the rule of lenity 
requires the ambiguity to be resolved in Mr. Smith's favor. See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 
145 Idaho 99, 103 (2007). In this case, that would mean that Mr. Smith should be 
credited for the time he spent on probation adhering to the restrictions thereof. 
As such, the denial of credit for the time Mr. Smith spent on probation, in the 
custody of the Department of Correction, subject to the numerous restrictions on his 




The District Court Improperly Denied Mr. Smith's Rule 35 Motion And Failed To Provide 
An Adequate Record In Regard To Its Denials Of His Rule 35 Motion And Motion For 
Credit For Time Served 
A. The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Smith's Rule 35 Motion To Correct An 
Illegal Sentence And Provide A Correct Calculation Of Credit For Time Served 
As "Untimely" 
Rule 35 provides that motions to correct illegal sentences and motions for correct 
computation of credit may be made at any time. I.C.R. 35(a), (c). Only requests to 
correct sentences imposed in an illegal manner or pleas for leniency are limited in the 
time to file. I.C.R. 35(b). Mr. Smith's motion indicated that it was filed to correct an 
illegal sentence. (R., p.227.) In the brief he filed in support of his motion, he argued 
that it was illegal to deny him credit for the time served on probation because doing so 
violated his Fifth and Eighth Amendment Rights, as well as several Idaho statutes. 
(R., p.235.) Substantively, he argued additional grounds for why the district court's 
denial of credit was incorrect. (R., pp.235-47.) Under either view, however, this motion 
had no time limit for filing. I.C.R. 35(a), (c). As such, the district court's denial of that 
motion as "[u]ntimely" is in error. (See R., p.227.) Therefore, the district court's denial 
of Mr. Smith's Rule 35 motion should also be reversed and the case remanded for a 
proper calculation of credit. 
As set forth in Section I, supra, Mr. Smith is entitled to credit for the time he 
served on probation, adhering to the terms thereof. Therefore, this Court should 
reverse the district court's denial of his motion and remand for a proper calculation of 
credit. 
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B. The District Court Failed To Issue Sufficient And Proper Orders In Response To 
Mr. Smith's Motions 
The district court also failed to comply with I.C.R. Rule 47 (hereinafter, Rule 47), 
which requires any written orders made in response to a filed motion to be entered "on a 
separate document." I.C.R. 47. This failure, in regard to the motions for early release 
(R., p.176), for credit for time served (R., p.185), and for a correct computation of credit 
(R., p.227), should be corrected in order to ensure both sufficiency and clarity in the 
record. For example, the district court failed to indicate whether it was denying or 
granting Mr. Smith's motion for credit in its handwritten notation on the face of that 
motion. (R., p.185.) Presumably, had it taken the time to generate the separate written 
order required by Rule 47, it would have clearly indicated whether it had, in fact, granted 
or denied the motion. 
As the district court failed to provide a sufficient record, this case should be 
remanded, at least to provide for a sufficient record. Compare Turner v. State, 667 
So.2d 882, 882 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that similar handwritten notations 
failed to provide an appropriate order from the trial court under Florida's rules of 
appellate procedure, and so merited remand on that ground).20 As such, Mr. Smith 
would request this Court remand with instructions that proper orders be entered in 
20 Both motions challenged on this ground addressed the same issue-whether he was 
entitled to credit for the time on probation. It is clear that the district court did not intend 
to grant Mr. Smith credit for the time he served on probation with its denials of his 
motions for early release and to get a correct computation of credit. (See R., pp.176, 
227.) He also indicated in his notice of appeal that his motion for credit had been 
denied. (R., p.195.) As such, it is reasonable to assume that the district court will enter 
written orders pursuant to Rule 47 denying the motions, and the issue regarding 
whether Mr. Smith should receive the requested credit will return to this court at that 
time. Therefore, in the interest of judicial efficiency, Mr. Smith would ask this Court to 
consider all the issues raised at this time. 
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regard to his motion for early release (R., p.176), his motion for credit for time served 
(R., p.185), and his motion to have a correct computation of credit. (R., p.227.) 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Smith respectfully requests this Court reverse the district court's denial of 
credit and remand this case for a proper calculation of the time for which he should 
receive credit. Alternatively, he respectfully requests that this case be remanded so that 
a proper and sufficient record might be established. 
DATED this 24th day of April, 2012. 
L/.L 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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